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ABSTRACT
The distribution of employment among Agriculture, Industry, and
Service within countries is closely related to the level of real Gross
Domestic Product per capita. As real income rises, Agriculture's share
falls, Service employment rises, and Industryts share rises to a peak
at about $3,300 (1970 dollars) per capita and then declines. U.S. time
series and OECD cross—sections follow almost identical patterns of
employment change. The decline of Agriculture is attributable primarily
to differences in income elasticity of demand but the shift from Industry
to Service is attributable primarily to differential rates of growth of
output per worker. Economic growth also contributes to the rise of
service employment through an increase in female labor force participation
because families with working wives tend to spend a higher proportion
of their income on services. Productivity tends to grow less rapidly in
the Service sector than in the rest of the economy, but the shift of
employment to Services was not a major factor in the slowing of aggregate
productivity in the United States in the 1970's.
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Introduction
Interest among economists in the interaction between economic
growth and the industrial distribution of employment goes back more than
forty years to the seminal work of Allan C. B. Fisher (1935) and Cohn
Clark (1940). "The most important concomitant of economic progress,"
wrote Clark, is "the movement of labor from agriculture to manufacture,
and from manufacture to commerce and services."This prediction, it must
be stated at the outset, is not derived from economic theory. Changes in
the distribution of employment across industries are primarily the
result of differences in income elasticities of demand for different
goods and services and differences in rates of growth of labor productivity.
Such differences exist, but there is nothing in economic theory that
tells us that they will, or that when they do the differences will be
systematic and predictable.
Clark's generalization, as well as the findings to be discussed
in this paper, should be viewed as descriptions of empirical regularities,
not tests of theoretically grounded hypotheses. They are, nevertheless,
of considerable interest. They do throw light on the growth process as
*Helpful comments on this research by the participants in the
Stanford University Labor Workshop are gratefully acknowledged. I would
also like to thank Nick Dyer and Phihlip Farrell for research assistance,
Claire Gilchrist for secretarial assistance, and the NBER for financial
assistance. The research reported here is part of the NBER's research in
Labor Economics. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not
those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.2
it has in fact evolved. Given the robustness of the regularities, they do
permit private and public decisionmakers to anticipate shifts in employment.
Andtheymay help us understand the extent to which shifts in the
distribution of employment can feed back on the growth process itself.
A National Bureau of Economic Research project on the U.S. service
industries (Fuchs 1968, Fuchs 1969) provided substantial confirmation of
Clark's observation up to 1965, and also explored the reasons for the
inter—sectoral shifts in employment. Investigators in other countries
reported similar patterns (Of er 1967a, Lengellé 1966, Worton 1969, Deakin
and George 1965), although there is clearly some variation. The
USSR experience, for instance, shows that the rate of growth of services
can be altered by public policy. The Soviets seem to have made a deliberate
effort to favor employment in manufacturing and to hold back the development
of trade and services (Ofer l967b).-' In Latin America, by contrast, it
is my impression that the increase of employment in trade and services has
outpaced overall economic growth, possibly as an unintended consequence of
relatively high wages in manufacturing and other policies which accelerated
migration from rural to urban areas.
In this paper I bring up to date a broad overview of the U.S.
experience and compare that experience with the pattern of development
in the OECD countries. A new functional form for relating employment
shares by sector to Gross Domestic Product is presented and its predictive
accuracy assessed. I then examine one possible intervening variable
between economic growth and the rise of service employment, namely an
increase in female labor force participation. Expenditure data from a
'Anotherway of interpreting the USSR experience is to say that
the time of the consumer has been substituted for measured employment in
retail trade.3
U.S. household survey are used to estimate the effects of a wife's
participation in the labor market on the demand for services vs. goods.
The paper concludes with a discussion of somepossible effects of the rise
of service employment on economic growth.
The sector definitions used in this paper are the same as those
I used in The Service Economy: "Agriculture" includes farming, forestry
and fishing; "Industry" includes mining, construction, transportation,
communications, and public utilities, as well as manufacturing; "Service"
includes all other industries, most notably trade; finance, insurance,
and real estate; professional, personal, business, and repair services;
and government (except those government enterprises which carry on
activities similar to those covered in "Industry").' This classification,
which is admittedly arbitrary, is similar to the one employed by Simon
Kuznets in Modern Economic Growth (1966) and has been used by other
investigators as well. The most questionable decision, the placement of
transportation, communication, and public utilities in "Industry" rather
than "Service," had very little impact on any of the conclusions for the
United States.
The measurement of real output in the Service sector is, of course,
notoriously weak because of difficulties in evaluating quality change
and because substantial portions of the output are not sold in conventional
markets. In my judgment, however, the most important conclusions regarding
Service—Industry differentials are not attributable to biases in measurement.
While growth of output in some branches of Service is probably understated
in the official accounts (e.g., government services, banking) there are
three—fold classification into Agriculture, Industry and
Service is traditional. The rapid expansion of Service, however,
suggests that disaggregation of that sector is highly desirable,
although beyond the scope of this paper.4
other industries, such as retail trade, where the rate of growth of output
is probably overstated (see Schwartzman 1969 in Fuchs 1969). Furthermore,
there are significant portions of Industry where the official measures of
real output are probably significantly biased (e.g., computer manufacturing,
airplane manufacturing, construction).
Another measurement problem involves international comparisons
of Gross Domestic Product at a point in time. In this paper I use the
results of Irving Kravis and his colleagues (1978) to convert GDP estimates
in own currency into U.S. dollar equivalents by actual comparison of
prices. Such conversions undoubtedly come closer to the purchasing power
parity concept than do the official exchange rates. I have, however,
checked my results against those obtained using official exchange rates
and the qualitative conclusions regarding the relationship between
economic growth and sector employment shares are not sensitive to choice
of conversion method.
Gross Domestic Product and sector shares of employment
Table 1 presents the distribution of employment by sector in the
United States since 1870 and shows its relation to per capita GDP (in 1970
U.S. dollars). This relation Is partially confounded by cyclical
fluctuations (Industry's share of employment decreases during recessions)
and by historical shifts in International trade patterns. Nonetheless,
the dramatic fallof Agriculture, the rise and then fall of Industry, and
the steady rise of Service employment is clearly discernible.
To be sure, the shifts revealed in Table 1 could be the result of
historical changes in technology or tastes which happen to be correlated
with the trend in real GDP per capita. An examination of Inter—country5
































1920 1907 24 41 35
1930 2137 22 36 42
1940 2546 19 37 44
1950 3439 12 42 46
1960 3938 7 41 52
1970 4798 4 39 57




GDP: 1870—1960 (in 1929 $)fromHistorical Statistics of the U.S., 1970,
Series Fl25.
1970 and 1978 are from Economic Report of the President, 1980,
Table B—9.
All amounts converted to 1970 prices using GDP implicit price
deflator (from Economic Report of the President, Table B—4).
Resident Historical Statistics of the U.S. 1970, Series A—7,
Population: for 1870—1970 (July 1 estimate).
Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1978, Table 2,
(April 1 estimate).
Civilian employment by sector:
1870—1930 Victor R. Fuchs, The Service Economy, NBER 1968, General
Series No. 87, Table 4, Variant 2.
1940—1960 U.S. Bureau of the Census,U.S. Census of Population: 1960,
Part 1, United States Summary, November 1963, Table 92.
1970 U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population,
Detailed Characteristics, U.S. Summary, Final Report
PC(1)—Dl, February 1973, Table 232.
1978 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings,
May 1978, Vol. 25, No. 5.6
differences at a fixed point in time provides an alternative view of the
relation between economic growth and the distribution of employment.
Table 2 shows the cross—section relation between GDP per capita and sector
employment shares in OECD countries in 1970. The general pattern seems
roughly similar to that of the U.S. historical experience; the extent of
the similarity and the nature of the differences are explored through
regression analysis.
In order to develop a realistic, estimable form that relates each
sector's share of employment to the level of GDP, I assume that:
1) Agriculture's share is 1.0 at zero GDP per capita and approaches
(GDP) zero asymptotically as GDP rises: A =e
2) Service's share is zero at zero GDP per capita and approaches
(GDP') 1.0 asymptotically as GDP rises:S =1—e
These equations were transformed to logarithms and estimated as a system
using a maximum likelihood iterative procedure:/'
Ln A =GDP and Ln(1 —5) =SGDP1
Inasmuch as Industry's share equals one minus the shares of Agriculture and
Service by definition, the Industry equation is obtained as the residual:
I =S(GDP')—(GDPa)
These regressions were run for the U.S. historical data and for
OECD cross—sections in 1960, 1970, and 1976. For the OECD countries in
1970, GDP per capita in 1970 U.S. dollars was obtained from Kravis etal.
using the International Comparison Project direct estimates for eight
countries and Kravis et al. indirect estimates for the remainder. Real
GDP per capita in 1960 (or 1976) was estimated in U.S. 1970 dollars by
fixing the 1970 purchasing power parity estimate as the base and
am grateful to Bronwyn Hall for suggesting this general form
and to Phillip Farrell for working out the details of the estimation.7
Table 2. Gross Domestic Product per capita (1970 U.S. dollars) and sector
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Turkey 365 881 70 16 13
Portugal 709 1298 30 38 33
Greece 1135 1854 39 33 28
Spain 1087 1902 30 42 28
Ireland 1336 2041 27 36 37
Italy 1720 2357 20 45 35
Austria 1930 2496 19 47 35
Japan 1906 2836 17 42 40
Finland 2251 3022 23 43 35
United Kingdom 2189 3042 3 52 45
New Zealand 2237 3094 13 47 40
Iceland 2424 3219 18 45 36
Norway 2874 3276 14 48 38
Netherlands 2433 3291 7 45 48
Australia 2946 3334 8 47 45
Belgium 2639 3449 5 50 46
Switzerland 3195 3468 9 54 38
France 2788 3506 14 46 40
Denmark 3157 3516 11 44 45
West Germany 3070 3746 9 55 36
Luxembourg 3137 3846 9 52 39
Canada 3885 3923 8 39 54
Sweden 4110 4148 8 45 47
United States 4790 4790 5 40 55
MEAN 2430 3014 17.3 43.7 39.0
'Measured real GDP/capita basedon direct price comparisons [Kravis et al.,
1978, Table 1] for Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, France,
Germany, and United States. Other countries: indirect estimates of real
GDP/capita [Kravis etal., Table 4, Series D,except Luxembourg, Series C].
Sources:
GDP per capita: Kravis, Heston, and Summers, "Real GDP per capita for More
Than One Hundred Countries," The Economic Journal, Vol. 88,
No. 350, June 1978, Tables 1 and 4.
Civilian Employment by Sector: OECD "Labor Force Statistics, 1966—1977,"
Paris 1979, Country Tables III.
1971 data for Greece.
Armed forces included in service sector for Japan, Austria,
Greece, Portugal and Sweden.
Transportation subsector estimated from closest available year
for Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, and Turkey.8
extrapolating back to 1960 (or forward to 1976) using each country's own
estimatedrate of change of real GDP per capita.
The results, presented in Table 3, show similar parameter values
for all four sets of estimates.-' Moreover, as shown in Table 4, the
correlation between the shares predicted by the regressions and the actual
shares is very high in all cases (the median coefficient is .88). Indeed,
the coefficients of correlation between cross—predictions (using equations
estimated from other series) and actual values are, on average, about as high
as the coefficients between the predicted and actual shares of the same series.
The similarity of the patterns and the goodness of fit are also
revealed in the graphs of the U.S. and 1970 OECD equations presented in
Figure 1. The curves for Agriculture are virtually identical. The curves
for Industry and those for Service also reveal a close correspondence in the
shape of the U.S. time series and the OECD cross—section, but there is a
noticeable difference in levels. At any given level of real GDP per capita,
the U.S. has had a larger fraction of employment in Service and a smaller
fraction in Industry than have the other OECD countries. This may be
explained by differences in composition of exports, with Industry playing
a larger role in the other OECD countries and Agriculture playing a larger
role in the U.S. It is particularly interesting to note that both the
U.S. and the OECD equations predict a peak in Industry's share of employment
at approximately the same level of real GDP per capita——somewhere between
$3,000 and $3,500 in 1970 dollars.
Inspection of the actual shares (also plotted on Figure 1) shows
that most observations fall very close to the estimated curves. For the
U.S. time series, the median residual (absolute) is approximately .01 in
each sector. As might be expected, 1930 and 1940 both show negative
residuals for Industry (—.03)because of the Depression.
.JFor the three OECD sets ofregressions, a test based on the
difference in the logarithms of the likelihood functions indicates that the
null hypothesis of no difference among the three years cannot be rejected,
evenatapof .5.9
Table 3. Regression results: sector shares of civilian employment as













































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
GDP per capita in U.S. 1970 thousands of dollars. Currency
conversions based on direct price comparisons for 1970.10
Table 4. Coefficients of correlation between actual and predicted





1870—1978 OECD1960 OECD 1970 OECD 1976
Agriculture
U.s. 1870—1978 .986 .891 .924 .948
OECD 1960 .984 .893 .926 .952
OECD 1970 .986 .890 .923 .949
OECD 1976 .986 .890 .923 .947
industry
U.S. 1870—1978 .900 .832 .832 .754
OECD 1960 .886 .836 .820 .698
OECD 1970 .902 .830 .833 .766
OECD 1976 .901 .832 .833 .758
Service
U.S. 1870—1978 .987 .796 .842 .871
OECD 1960 .987 .796 .842 .870
OECD 1970 .987 .796 .842 .869















Figure 1.Sector shares of civilian employment vs. real
GDP per capita, U.S. time series 1870-1798
and OECD cross-section 1970.
Legend:
a/
Solid lines show observed range of GDP/capita; dashed lines show extrapolations.
.6—
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GDP per capita (thousands of 1970 U.s. dollars)
Figure 1, concluded14
For the OECD series the median residuals (absolute) are:
Agriculture .03, Industry .03, and Service .04. Most countries conform well
to the predictions, but there are a few notably large residuals, some of
which are also observed in 1960 and 1976 (not plotted). Turkey and Greece
consistently have a larger than predicted share of employment in Agriculture
and have large negative residuals in Industry. This may be related to the
employment of many Greek and Turkish nationals in other OECD countries.
The U.K. shows a large negative residual in Agriculture in 1960 and 1976
as well as 1970. The U.K. had a large positive residual in Industry in
1960; this was smaller in 1970 and had virtually disappeared in 1976.
West Germany shows an interesting pattern with substantially more
employment in Industry in 1970 and 1976 than would be expected given its
real GDP per capita. This excess is exactly offset by a negative residual
in Service. The growth of industrial exports by Germany may account for
some of this pattern.
One of the most demanding tests of an alleged economic relationship
is to see how well a cross—section regression predicts change over time.
Another test is to see if a time—series regression for one period in one
country predicts changes in other countries over a different time period.
By this standard, the functions portrayed in Figure 1 stand up rather well
(see Table 5). The actual changes in sector shares in the OECD countries
between 1960 and 1976 are positively correlated with predicted changes
based on either the 1970 OECD regression or the U.S. 1870—1978 regression.
The correlation coefficient between actual and predicted change
is much lower for Service than for Industry or Agriculture, but this
seems to be because the variance in change is small. Between 1960 and
1976 every country showed an increase in the share of employment in Service;
the mean change was .12, but the standard deviation was only .04. Despite15
Table 5. Correlation coefficients and residuals of actual and predicted




between actual change and
predicted change, based on:
OECD 1970 regression .760 .786 .356
U.S. 1870—1978 regression .757 .785 .324
Median change (absolute) .09 .05 .12
Median residual (abso1ute)' .04 .06 .02






X =actualsector share, and=sharepredicted by 1970 OECD regression.16
the large change in the Service share in most countries, the difference
between the actual and predicted change (median absolute residual) was
less than .02 for half the countries and only two countries had absolute
residuals larger than .06.
Although the correlation coefficient for Industry is higher than
for Service, the median absolute residual is actually higher also. During
the period 1960—76 many of the OECD countries were at levels of GDP per
capita that put them on the flat portion of the Industry employment share
curve. For those countries, changes in that share between 1960 and 1976
were affected relatively more by cyclical phenomena and country—specific
transitory factors in either 1960 or 1976 than by movement along the long—run
function.
Reasons for the rise of service employment in the U.S. since 1948
The rise of Service employment in the course of economic growth
is certainly beyond question, but the reasons for the correlation are
more difficult to establish. Fisher and Clark both emphasized sector
differences in income elasticities of demand, and this view is also held
by many current writers (e.g., Richard Caves (1980)). I believe the
emphasis on differential income elasticities is correct if one thinks of
the expansion of the Service sector as part of the growth of nonagricultural
output relative to Agriculture. At higher levels of GDP per capita,
however, the principal phenomenon to be explained is the growth of Service
employment relative to Industry.-1 This differential, in my judgment, is
due more to differential trends in labor productivity than to differences
in income elasticities, at least in the United States.
-"Agriculture becomes a much smaller and lessimportant part of
the employment story.17
Consider the measures in Table 6 which show sector rates of change
(and levels) of employment, output, and productivity in theU.S. from 1948 to
1978. We see that the rate of growth of employment in the Service sector
exceeded that in Industryby 1.55 percentage points per annum. By contrast, the
differential in the rate of growth of output (GDP1n 1972 dollars) was only
.40 percentage points per annum. Thus, in a purely statistical sense the
largest part of the differential trend in employment is attributable to the
differential trend in output perworker (1.15 percentage points per annum).-'
To be sure, thedifferential trend inreal GDPmay understate the effects of
sector differences in income elasticities somewhat because the rise in the
relative price of Service output probably deflected some demand to Industry.
On the other hand, some of the growth of real GDP in the Service sector does
not represent any real addition in service activity, but is attributable to
a shift of services formerly produced within Industry to separate
identifiable firms classified in the Service sector.
It is important to note that not all of the differential in rate
of change of output per worker can be regarded as a pure productivity
differential. The sector difference in trends of output per unit of total
factor input is estimated from the trends in GDP in constant dollars
relative to GDP in current dollars as follows:
=(0—G)— — Gt)
where IT =relativetotal factor productivity;
o=GDPin constant dollars;
G =GDPin current dollars;
s =sectors;
t =totaleconomy
and all variables are rates of change.





-'These differentials have beenfairly stable throughout the
post—World War II period, except for predictable changes associated with
cyclical fluctuations and periods of military conflict.18
Table 6. Rates of change of employment, output and productivity
1948—78 (percent per annum).














GDP 1978 $ (billions)
a!—Totalestimated separately and GDP maynot exactly equal sum of sectors.
-'1Persons engaged, full—time equivalents.
c/ . . — Derivedfrom the differential rates of change of GDP in constant and current dollars.
(See text for explanation.)
(1) Employment-"
(2) GDP (1972 $)
(3)GDP (current $)
(4)Output per worker (2) —(1)
Rates relative to total economy
(5) Output per worker
(6) Output per unit ofc
total factor input—
—2.11 + .76 +2.31 +1.55 +1.40
+1.08 +3,37 +3.77 + .40 +3.51
+3.40 +6.60 +7.73 +1.13 +7.00
+2.61 +1.46 —1.15 +2.11
+1.08 +.50 —.65 —1.15
+1.17 +.26 —.47 —.73
6.6 26.1 28.0 60.7
28.0 209.3 250.0 485.9
24.0 121.3 113.8 257.9
3.5 32.8 56.0 92.3
38.7 574.7 774.2 1391.1
66.6 879.6 1157.5 2107.019
This is a reasonable approximation unless the prices of factors of production
change at substantially different rates in Industry and Service, or unless
relative factor prices change substantially and there are marked differences
in factor proportions in the two sectors.
The total factor productivity differential between Service and
Industry is only .73 percent per annum, indicating that part of the reason
for the large differential trend in output per worker (and for the growth
of Service employment) is the more rapid growth of other inputs (physical
and human capital) in Industry. This has occurred at a rate of .42 percent
per annum (1.15— .73), and this conclusion is independent of possible errors
in measuring constant dollar GDP in either sector.
This result suggests several interesting questions for research.
Have other OECD countries experienced a similar pattern in recent decades?
Is the faster growth of capital per worker in Industry in the U.S.
attributable to non—neutral technological change, or to the greater amount
of unionization in Industry than in Service, or to other factors? Another
interesting research question is to identify the sources of the .73 percent
per annum "pure" productivity differential, e.g. economies of scale or
technological progress.
Female labor force participation and the demand for services
In the U.S. data for 1870—1978, both real GDP per capita and the
service sector's share of total employment are highly correlated with the
female labor force participation rate)' One possible connection is that
the growth of Service employment induces a rise in female labor force
'This correlation isnot observed in the OECD cross—section
data.20
participation by expanding job opportunities in industries which have
traditionally been heavily female. Between 1950 and 1970 almost one—half
of the female—male differential in the rate of growth of employment is
attributable to changes in industry mix rather than to an increase in the
female share of employment in each industry (Fuchs 1978).
A causal connection which runs from real GD? per capita to female
labor force participation is also plausible. Gary Becker (1965) and
Jacob Mincer (1962) have argued that economic growth tends to raise the
value of women's time in the labor market relative to the value of time
at home, thus inducing more women to participate in paid work. In recent
decades in the U.S. the increase in female labor force participation has
been notable among married women with spouse present and most notable among
those who have young children at home (see Table 7).
When a wife enters paid employment, the household's demand for goods
and services may change differentially for two principal reasons. First,
the household will typically have more money income and income elasticities
of demand may differ. Second, the household may reallocate expenditures
because the wife now has less time for production in the home or because she
demands a different mix of commodities in connection with her work. For
instance, the household with a working wife may allocate a larger share of
expenditures to restaurant meals or to domestic servants, or the wife may
purchase an automobile in order to get to work.
To explore the possible differential impact of rising female labor
force participation on the demand for goods and services, a statistical
experiment was performed on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Consumer Expenditure Survey 1972—73)' In order to increase the homogeneity
am grateful to Robert Michael for making this data set available
to me, and for his advice concerning the effects of demographic variables
on consumer demand.21
Table 7. Female labor force participation by family status, the United
States, selected years 1950 to 1978 (percent participating).
1950 1960 1970 1978
All females——allages 33.9 37.7 43.3 50.0
All females——age35—44 39.1 43.4 51.1 61.3








under 6 11.9 18.6 30.3 41.6
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, 1979 Employment and Training Report
of the President.22
of the sample, the analysis was restricted to white, home—owning households
consisting of a wife, an employed husband, and one or two children under
the age of 18 (N =829).Unfortunately, it is not possible with these data
to make a consistent match between consumer expenditure classes and the
sector classifications previously discussed (based on employment and Gross
Domestic Product). I try to achieve rough comparability by grouping
expenditures into "goods," "services," and "other." "Goods" consist of
food, alcohol, and tobacco consumed at home; clothing; vehicles and
transportation; and all other durables. "Services" consists of food and
alcohol consumed away from home; vacations; domestic servants, laundry and
dry cleaning; and out—of—pocket expenditures for health and education.
"Other" is equal to the household's after—tax income minus "goods" and
"services." It includes saving, home mortgage payments, real estate taxes,
life insurance premiums, and a variety of miscellaneous goods and services,
such as heating fuel, telephone, and electricity.
To determine the effect-' of a wife working on the share of
expenditures going to goods or services, the logarithm of the expenditure
share is regressed on a dummy variable "wife working full time" (compared
with wife not working at all) plus a large number of other variables
introduced to control for other factors that might affect expenditure shares.
These are: age of husband, education of husband, education of wife, number
and age of children, region of country, size of city, and the logarithm of
total expenditures. In one set of regressions total expenditures are equal
to goods plus services plus other. In the other set, the total is only the
-1This model assumes that causality runs from the employment status
of wife to expenditure patterns, not the reverse. To the extent that the
reverse causality is true, the coefficient of the wife's work status variable
may be biased. I am grateful to Thomas MaCurdy for discussion of this point.23
sum of goods and services. The dependent variable is always the logarithm
of the share of total expenditures in a particular class (i.e., goods,
services or other).
The regression coefficient of the wife working variable shows the
difference between households with wife working full time and those with
wife not working in the share of total expenditures spent for the designated
class of commodities. Because the dependent variable is the logarithm of
the share, the coefficient indicates the percent differential. For example,
a coefficient of —.04for goods in the first regression (Table 8) indicates
that in households with wife working the share of goods in total expenditures
is four percent less than in households with wife not working.
Three regressions were run for each class in each set. In the first,
no other independent variables were included. In the second, all the other
variables except the log of total expenditures were included; this variable
was added in the third. Thus the third shows the reallocative effect net
of possible differential income elasticity effects.
Table 8 indicates that the effect of a wife working on expenditure
shares is different for goods than for services and the difference is
statistically significant at p <.01.This result holds regardless of which
other variables are included and regardless of how "total expenditures" is
specified)1 The share of expenditures going to servicesseems to rise by
about 10 percent as a result of a wife going to work. (I.e., if the share
in a household with wife not working is .30, it would be .33 in a similar
household with a working wife.) The share going to goods seems to fall by
about three or four percent. The fact that the coefficients are very similar
regardless of whether the logarithm of total expenditures is held constant
-'Theconsistency of results is also observed in more complex
specifications (not shown) which allow for possible interactions between
wife's work status and income.24
Table 8. Regressions of logaripm of expenditure shares on employnent status of wife







Regression coefficient of wife work-
ing full time vs. wife not working
(Standard errors of regression
coefficients in parentheses)
Goods Services Other
1 Ln of share
of "total"
/ expenditures
None —.042 +.093 +.063
(.034) (.045) (.051)




3 " All!' +.007 +.ll3 +.003
(.033) (.045) (.051)











6 " Al1' —.033 +.l09
(.011) (.039)
'Other variablesare age of head, education of head, education of wife, number and
age of children, region of country, city size, and logarithm of total expenditures.
'Limited to white,home—owning households with wife, employed husband, and one or
two children under age 18.
'Total expenditures =Goodsplus Services plus Other.
'Total expenditures =Goodsplus Services.25
or not suggests that the difference in effect on goods and services is
primarily due to reallocation rather than to differential income elasticities.
If we take these results at face value, the reallocative effect of
a wife going to work is approximately .1. Thus, an increase in the female
labor force participation rate of one percentage point per year (the U.S.
experience since 1950 has come close to that rate of change) would imply
a shift of demand toward services of approximately .1 percent per annum.
This is about one—fourth of the .4 percent per annum shift in the service
sector's share of real GDP shown in Table 6.
This experiment can hardly be regarded as definitive, but it does
suggest that in the U.S. the increase in female labor force participation
may have made a small contribution to the rise of service employment
through a reallocation of expenditures by households toward services.
Effects of the rise of service employment on economic growth
At the present time there seems to be more interest in the
consequences of the rise in Service employment on economic growth than
in explanations of why growth shifts employment to Services. This interest
is undoubtedly triggered by the slowdown in aggregate productivity growth
in the United States and other countries, and the desire to attribute the
slowdown to some one or some thing. Because productivity rises more
slowly in Service than in Industry, some observers take it as self—evident
that the growth of the Service sector's share of employment must be a
major factor in the productivity malaise of the 1970's. A healthy skepticism
about such a facile explanation, however, is clearly in order. After all,
the shift to Service employment was every bit as strong during the earlier
post—war decades when aggregate productivity was rising rapidly.26
Serious analysis must begin by noting that changes in the sector
distribution of employment can change the aggregate productivity trend
only through level effects, rate effects, and the interaction between these
effects. Level effects can be significant if the sectors differ substantially
in the level of productivity in the base year and if there are substantial
shifts in sector shares of constant dollar GDP over time. A classic
example of the level effect is the shift In constant dollar GDP from
Agriculture (a sector with relatively low base year productivity) to
Industry and Service. This shift undoubtedly contributed to aggregate
productivity growth in the United States and in other countries as well.
The rate effect depends on sector differences in rates of growth
of productivity and on a shift in input shares between sectors.-' Thus
the decline in the share of employment in Agriculture (a sector with
particularly rapid productivity growth in the U.S.) has tended to slow
down the change in aggregate productivity.
Given the relatively small share of Agriculture in the U.S. economy
in the 1970's (measured either in employment or GDP), it Is most fruitful
to concentrate on the Industry—Service differential in order to determine
the extent to which the shift to Service employment can explain changes
in aggregate productivity trends. Michael Grossman and I explored this
question in considerable detail with a series of simulations under a variety
of assumptions about sector levels and rates of change in productivity
(Grossman and Fuchs 1973). Given reasonable parameter values, based on U.S.
experience, we found that the growth of the Service sector relative to Industry
could account for only small changes in productivity trends even over a
fifty—year period. The principal reason is that the distribution of
simplify, the following discussion will assume that there is
only one input——"employinent." The conclusion would not be materially
altered by consideration of multiple inputs.27
constant dollar GDP between Industry and Service has not changed much in
the last three decades (see Table 6); thus the level effect must be small.
If, for simplicity, we assume constant shares of real GDP, the rate of
change in aggregate productivity is a weighted average of the rates of




whereR =rateof change of productivity;





The effect of the shift to Service then, is the change in weights
multiplied by the differential in the rates. We see in Table 6 that the
Industry—Service differential in rate of change of labor productivity is
1.15 percent per annum, and of total factor productivity, .73 percent per
annum. The change in the Service sector's employment share of Industry
plus Service is from .52 in 1948 to .63 in 1978)' Roughly speaking, we
have a one percent per annum differential in rate multiplied by a .1 change
in weight. This implies a slowing down of aggregate productivity growth
in the U.S. of approximately .1 percent per annum between 1948 and 1978
as a result of the rise of Service employment. Inasmuch as the slowdown
in aggregate productivity growth is at least one percent per annum, we
see that the growth of the Service sector cannot be a major explanatory factor.
-'The Service share ofIndustry plus Service total input increased
from .48 to .57.28
A few additional points about U.S. growth in recent decades are
worth noting. The rapid increase in female labor force participation
since the end of World War II has tended to raise the rate of growth of
measured real GDP per capita because the ratio of working to total
population has risen. To the extent that women are now producing less in
nonmarket activities (not included in GDP), this is a spurious growth of
total economic output. Another effect of the rise in female labor force
participation is to lower the rate of growth of output per worker, but
this too is spurious because it reflects a change in labor force mix rather
than a slowdown in productivity for given workers. Finally, even if both
the above effects of rising female labor force participation have been
operative in the U.S., they can scarcely be a source of any significant
change in the rate of change because female labor force participation has
been rising rapidly throughout the post—World War II era.29
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